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A commentary on
Commentary: “Multimodal Theories of Recognition and Their Relation to Molyneux’s
Question”
by Schwenkler, J. (2015). Front. Psychol. 6:1792. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01792
When William Molyneux posed his famous thought experiment to the philosopher, John Locke, it
was framed to address the transfer of sensory information between touch and vision. Molyneux’s
Question (MQ), appearing in Altieri (2015) and also Schwenkler (2015), was stated by Locke:
“Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a Cube, and
a Sphere..., so as to tell, when he felt one and t’other, which is the Cube, which the Sphere. Suppose then
the Cube and Sphere placed on a Table, and the Blind Man to be made to see. Quære, whether by his
sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the Globe, which the Cube.”
-Locke (1694/1979).
I argue in this paper that MQ has far broader ramifications than a thought experiment inquiring
whether visual-to-tactile representations are acquired through sensory experience. Specifically,
I will respond to Schwenkler (2015) and argue that MQ generalizes, in certain cases, to other
modalities such as audition and vision.
Recently, I argued (2015) that an affirmative answer to MQ does not necessarily imply nativism,
which is the position that (certain) ideas or representations exist prior to sensory experience.
Nativist theories, Schwenkler (2015) and I seem to agree, require additional assumptions before
they definitively predict a “Yes” response to MQ. Such a variety of nativism requires sensory
information—auditory and tactile in the specific case of MQ—to subsist in a common amodal code.
To illustrate this point, consider what would be required for a newly sighted individual, already
familiar with the form of a sphere and the cube through the sense of touch, to prove capable of
identifying them by sight alone. An abstract representation of these shapes must have arisen outside
the tactile modality to become immediately accessible to vision1.
PROBLEMS WITH COMMON CODE THEORY?
The primary controversy described by Schwenkler (2015) concerns the extent to which MQ
generalizes to situations involving other sensory modalities given the veracity of common code
1Other nativist theories discussed by Altieri (2015) need not make such strong assumptions and therefore can predict a
negative response toMQ. One variety assumes the innateness of representations in onemodality although robust cross-modal
associations can arise out of perceptual experience or learning.
Altieri Molyneux’s Question
theory. Take, for instance, the McGurk effect (McGurk and
MacDonald, 1976). Akin to MQ, I previously argued that
common code theory predicts that newly sighted individuals
should experience the McGurk effect—perhaps at a rate similar
to typically developing adults (cf. Altieri, 2015; The canonical
effect occurs when auditory/ba/is presented with a speaker’s face
articulating “ga”; listeners, typically hear a fused consonant such
as “da” rather than/ba/).
Because the McGurk effect relates sound and vision, whereas
MQ relates touch and vision, the problem now becomes: does
common code theory requires an affirmative answer to both MQ
and Altieri’s question? First, I will argue that it should be the case
that common code theory predicts an affirmative response, unless
it makes one of the following ad hoc assumptions referenced
by Schwenkler (2015): (1) “it might be thought that low-level
spatial and temporal properties are commonly coded, whereas
high-level ones like abstract category membership are not,” and
furthermore, (2) “. . . it might be that vision and touch share an
innate common code, whereas the connections between these
modalities and those of smell and taste have to be learned” (p.
2). Hence, common code theory can be subdivided into different
varieties, similar to the way I showed how different varieties of
nativism can be specified. While such a sub-division appears
logically possible, it nullifies the basis of common code theory
inasmuch as it fails to assume that perception, qua recognition
and categorization, occurs in a manner that is inherently amodal.
As I stated (2015) “. . . recognition must occur through, or
representations must be translated into a common amodal code
(e.g., dynamic events or gestures)” (p. 2).
Thus, I argue that while logically possible for common
code theory to be construed in such a way that it predicts
an affirmative response for MQ but not Altieri’s question, this
scenario is unlikely. Supposing that sensory information is
amodal, then, we have to ask how it could be possible for a
newly sighted person to visually identify an object previously
only privy to the tactile modality, but not the auditory. How is
it that certain brain areas easily share information while others
have to develop connections, or stated differently, why should
preference be given to one modality over another if perception
occurs apart from modality? Nonetheless, Schwenkler (2015)
brings up an important point, apparent in point (2) above.
Paraphrasing, it seems that one potential problem is that even
when considering amodal representations, connections between
brain regions would either have to develop, whereas others
may subside innately (e.g., tactile-visual). This concern becomes
potentially more problematic in individuals with periods of
sensory deprivation during development.
It is important to emphasize, however, that the question
of what sensory modalities take precedent over others (e.g.,
whether visual cues are more apt to affect auditory or
tactile ones or vice versa) is purely an empirical matter.
Future research should benefit from examining the extent to
which vision overrides auditory or tactile cues in typically
developing, blind, and newly sighted individuals. The visual
dominance of the ventriloquist effect indicates that visual
cues naturally override auditory information (Alais and Burr,
2004). Sensory development also appears to alter auditory-
tactile mappings: One study showed that multiple auditory
stimulations evoke illusory tactile perceptions in sighted but
not congenitally blind subjects (Hotting and Roder, 2004).
This brings us to the following conclusion: I propose that
if the results of cross-modal studies—using visual-tactile and
visual-auditory paradigms—indicate similar performance across
newly sighted and normal adults, it would lend converging
support for common code theory. Conversely, differences would
support either modular (cf. Altieri, 2015) or possibly empiricist
theories.
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